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SECTION 102: A PERSISTENT MENACE
TO CLOSELY-HELD CORPORATIONS
THOMAS A. BOLAN I.

INTRODUCTION

A MONG lawyers, accountants and businessmen, perhaps no
other statute in recent years has stirred up as much
controversy, confusion and discussion as has Section 102 of
the Internal Revenue Code.'
In former times when a corporate board of directors determined to retain funds rather than distribute them as divit Member of the New York and Federal Bars.
1IT. REv. CODE § 102: "(a) Imposition of tax. There shall be levied,
collected, and paid for each taxable year (in addition to other taxes imposed
by this chapter) upon the net income of every corporation (other than a personal holding company as defined in section 501 or a foreign personal holding
company as defined in Supplement P) if such corporation, however created or
organized, is formed or availed of for the purpose of preventing the imposition of the surtax upon its shareholders or the shareholders of any other corporation, through the medium of permitting earnings or profits to accumulate
instead of being divided or distributed, a surtax equal to the sum of the
following:
"273/2 per centum of the amount of the undistributed section 102 net income not in excess of $100,000, plus
"38Y2 per centum of the undistributed section 102 net income in excess of

$100,000.

"(b) Prima facie evidence. The fact that any corporation is a mere holding or investment company shall be prima facie evidence of a purpose to avoid
surtax upon shareholders.
"(c) Evidence determinative of purpose. The fact that the earnings or
profits of a corporation are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable
needs of the business shall be determinative of the purpose to avoid surtax
upon shareholders unless the corporation by the clear preponderance of the
evidence shall prove to the contrary. . . ." See Legis., Section 102 and the
Forbidden Purpose, 26 ST. JOHN's L. Rlv. 371 (1952).
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dends, a challenge to their discretion could emanate only
from stockholders of the company. If the stockholders were
so inclined, they could take their grievances to court and
demand the declaration of a dividend. The answer given by
the courts would usually be that, barring bad faith, discretion to declare dividends lies primarily with the directors
and will not be interfered with by the courts unless clearly
arbitrary or unreasonable and, furthermore, what constitutes
a reasonable retention is necessarily best known by the
directors.2 Such a course is still open today to disgruntled
stockholders and the attitude of the courts is generally the
same.
If there were no considerations other than the foregoing,
the management of a corporation would be free to chart the
course of its company's progress, being conservative in the
preservation of the company's assets if its judgment so warranted, without fear of damaging reprisal in the courts. Unfortunately, no such peace of mind is today available to the
directors of many corporations. Section 102 enters the picture to whittle down their discretionary powers and often
forces them to declare dividends against the dictates of
sound business reasoning.
As worded, Section 102 endeavors to penalize severely
any corporation whose "purpose" in withholding dividends
is to prevent an imposition of surtax on its stockholders or
the stockholders of any other corporation. 3 The penalty consists of additional tax at the rate of 27 /2% on the first
$100,000 of "undistributed net income" of the year in question and 38 % on the balance. For its own purposes the
2 It is "a well-settled principle that whether or not dividends shall be paid,
and the amount of the dividend at any time, is primarily ,to be determined by
the directors, and there must be bad faith or a clear abuse of discretion on their
part to justify a court of equity in interfering; . . . their judgment in withholding a dividend from the stockholders will be regarded as conclusive, unless
they are controlled or limited by statute, charter, by-law, or vote of the stockholders, because it is a matter of internal management with which the courts
will not ordinarily interfere." 11 FLETcHER CYc. PRIvATE CoRP. 801-806 (Rev.

perm. ed. 1932).
3 Mead Corp. v. Commissioner, 116 F. 2d 187 (3d Cir. 1940), dealing with

§ 104 of the Revenue Act of 1928, a predecessor of § 102, and holding that
where a subsidiary was formed and availed of for the purpose of avoiding
surtaxes on the shareholders of the parent corporation, the subsidiary was not
subject to the penalty tax, is no longer law by virtue of the provisions of § 102.
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statute specifically defines undistributed net income 4 and,
very broadly speaking, it is what a corporation would have
for dividend purposes if there were no need to provide for
the future, less the excess of its long-term capital gains over
its short-term capital losses.' The statute also states that
the fact that any corporation is a mere holding or investment
corporation shall be prima facie evidence of a purpose to
avoid surtax upon shareholders.6 Domestic and foreign personal holding companies are now exempt from Section 102,
as they are well provided for elsewhere.'
It is not the purpose here to go into the legislative history of Section 102, as excellent summations thereof may be
found elsewhere." In passing, however, a few of the highlights may be pointed out. Statutes similar to Section 102 9
have been on the books since the Tariff Act of 1913, but at
that time the tax was on the stockholder and not the corporation. The early requirement that fraud be present was
eliminated in 1918. In 1921 the tax was shifted from the
individual to the corporation. At one period, 1924 to 1934,
the penalty tax was as high as 50% of the retained earnings.
4 INT. REv. CODE § 102(d) (2).

5 If the stockholders report dividends on the basis of their pro rata share
of the undistributed earnings, though none have been declared, such "consent
dividends" will be deducted indirectly from the amount of undistributed § 102
net income. See Westfall, Integrating Federal Income Taxes on Corporations
and Their Sharelwlders, 27 TAXES 236, 240 (1949), for a simplification of the
computation of undistributed § 102 net income, keeping in mind that in 1951
the statute was amended so as to allow a deduction for the excess of long-term
capital gains over short-term capital losses.
6 See Industrial Bankers Securities Corp. v. Higgins, 104 F. 2d 177, 181
(2d Cir. 1939), to the effect that the word "mere" in the statute must not be
ignored.
7 INT. REv. CODE § 500 imposes a surtax on domestic personal holding companies (as defined by INT. REv. CODE § 501) in addition to the regular corporation income tax, and INT. Rav. CODE § 337 levies a tax on United States
shareholders of foreign personal holding companies (as defined by INT. REv.
CODE § 331) based on their pro rata share of any undistributed net income. In
each case it is of no consequence that the surplus may have been properly
accumulated.
8 Buck & Shackelford, Retention of Earnings by Corporations Under the
Income Tax Laws, 36 VA. L. Rsv. 141 (1950) (the first of three published
parts, gives a review of the history and background of § 102). See also Turner,
Unreasonable Accumulation of Surplus ... Section 102, 26 TAxEs 839 (1948).
9 In dealing with § 102 and its forerunners, the principles laid down by the
Board of Tax Appeals and the courts have basically been applicable to both,
and, therefore, the citations appearing in this article will not be earmarked by
the particular penalty statute to which they refer.
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It was in 193 that personal holding companies were withdrawn from the scope of this tax. 10
The reason for the statute is obvious. In corporations
where small groups own large blocks of stock, the inclination on the part of dominating stockholders might be to
withhold dividends in order to escape the personal income
tax that would be imposed on them-the heavier the prospective tax, the greater the temptation. Thus, the excess
funds could be held by the corporation either until the individual income tax rates were reduced or until such time as
allowable personal income tax deductions or a reduction in
income from other sources would make a receipt of dividends
by the stockholder less productive tax-wise. Or perhaps the
aim might be to increase the value of the stock (by not declaring dividends) in order to later liquidate the company or
sell the stock at a profit, in either of which event the maximum tax would be just 26%. 11 If no distribution were made
before the stockholder's death, the only tax payable would be
an inheritance tax based on the market value of the stock at
the date of death, a consideration which also might weigh
heavily in the minds of controlling stockholders.
Though the statute purports to encompass only situations of this kind, i.e., where the plan of the corporation is
to avoid the imposition of surtaxes on its shareholders, its
consequences are much more far-reaching in that it also provides that whenever the corporation's accumulation of earnings is beyond its "reasonable needs," the corporation must
prove by a "clear preponderance of the evidence" that it was
free of any taint of the forbidden purpose.' 2 This is a severe
burden and one which a corporation quite conceivably could
not meet, despite an absence of the condemned intent. In
order to escape the penalty of the statute, the taxpayer invariably must show that its accumulation was reasonable,
for otherwise any other explanation of the surplus is almost.
10 Many of the early decisions on the subject under consideration dealt with
personal holding companies, which fact, however, does not weaken them as
precedents to any considerable degree.
32INT. REv. CODE §§115(c), 117(c) (2).
12
This provision was added by the Revenue Act of 1938. Prior thereto an
unreasonable accumulation merely created a presumption that the corporation
sought to evade taxes.
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certain to be unacceptable. In practical effect then, the
"liability for tax under Sec. 102 usually hinges on whether
the corporation has accumulated its earnings in excess of the
reasonable needs of the business." 13
Thus we come to the same criterion as is usually used
in stockholder suits to compel dividends: Was the action of
the directors in withholding dividends reasonable? Though
the same test is used in both cases, the fact that one involves
a stockholder and the other a taxpayer results in two entirely different viewpoints on what is reasonable. Thus in a
stockholder suit the court looks with a liberal eye at the action of the directors, but this is not the course followed when
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is the beneficiary of
a condemnation of such action. The "present day attitude
of the courts 14 and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
toward corporations is far from sympathetic," 1r and in an
effort to extract additional tax old principles are quickly
by-passed or discarded.
In the years before and during World War II, Section
102 did "not constitute any great threat to the ordinary corporate taxpayer. Prior to the war period, the section was
not aggressively enforced; and during the war period, since
income subject to excess profits tax was not subject to Sec.
102 tax, the section had little application." 10 At the present
time, however, Section 102 must be given extremely careful
consideration before any decision to withhold surplus beyond
a normal amount is made.1.7 This, of course, is particularly
true of corporations under the control of a small group of
& KILCULLEN, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 129-130 (1948).
14 As of October 22, 1942, the Board of Tax Appeals became known as "The
Tax Court of the United States" and the designation "court" or "courts" in
this article will frequently be used not only to indicate official courts but the
Board as well.
13 STANLEY

15 14 FLETCHER CYc. PRivATE CORP. 786 (Replacement vol. 1945), quoting
HENDERSON, INTRODUCTION TO INcOmE TAXATION § 106 (1st ed. 1943) as

follows:

"They [corporations] are artificial creatures of the law, looked at

as distinct and apart from their stockholders, and their capacity to pay tribute

is as indifferently appraised as if a committee of butchers waited on a corn-fed
steer at the stockyards gate."
16 STANLEY & KILCuLLEN, op. cit. supra note 13, at 128.
17 It is also advisable to first estimate the possible impact of § 102 before
making a choice of a business organization.

KNAPP & WARREN, FORMS OF

BuSINESS ORGANIZATION AND THE FEDERAL TAX LAWS 24 (Rev. ed. 1951).
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stockholders. For the unwary management of such corporations the situation is replete with dangerous possibilities.
II.

INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF SECTION

A.

102

In General

On its face, Section 102 seeks to penalize any corporation which has for its purpose the avoidance of surtaxes on
its shareholders through the medium of accumulating earnings or profits. Despite the clarity of the statutory language,
there is evidence in the decisions of efforts to enlarge the
stated prohibited purpose so as to include any use of a corporation to escape individual income taxes.18 Any endeavor
to thus broaden the scope of Section 102 would certainly
seem to be without justification. It has been conceded that
"a taxpayer has the legal right to decrease the amount of
what would be his taxes or avoid them by means which the
law permits." 19 Section 102 merely restricts the use of a
corporation for the purpose of accumulating earnings, thus
any other method of saving taxes through utilization of a
20
Incorporation, otherwise valid, should be permissible.
asmuch as the statute is penal in nature, "it should be
strictly construed and should not be extended to cover cases
Is "The organization of the plaintiff company [taxpayer] for the purpose
of preventing the imposition of the surtax upon its stockholders was itself an
inhibited act, and the very purpose of Congress was to prevent the evasion of
income tax by stockholders." Beim Co. v. Landy, 113 F. 2d 897, 900 (8th Cir.
1940). "The purpose of section 104 [a predecessor of 102] clearly was to
penalize the intentional avoidance of surtaxes upon individuals by the intervention of corporations." Corporate Investment Co., 40 B. T. A. 1156, 1177
(1939) (dissenting opinion).
IgHelvering v. Johnson, 104 F. 2d 140, 143 (8th Cir.), aff'd inetn., 308
U. S. 523 (1939).
20 Corporate Investment Co., 40 B. T. A. 1156 (1939), wherein it was held
that § 104, a forerunner of § 102, was not applicable, even though an individual
stockholder had deliberately used the taxpayer corporation to save taxes. However, on a similar set of facts in Beim Co. v. Landy, 113 F. 2d 897 (8th Cir.
1940), § 104 was held to apply. The following language of the dissenting opinion at 902 is quite persuasive: "Section 104 was directed at corporations which
were designed or used to prevent, through the accumulation of distributable
profits, the imposition of surtaxes upon their shareholders, and not at corporations designed or used to prevent, in some other way, the imposition of such
surtaxes. The Beim Company [the taxpayer involved] was formed to prevent
the imposition of surtaxes, but not in the particular way which would make
it liable to the . . . penalty tax."
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which do not fall within its letter." 21 The provisions of 102
are definite and specific and they clearly limit its application
to improper accumulation of earnings.
B.

The Prohibited Purpose

Although on the one hand, the courts have not been in
agreement as to whether or not the 102 penalty should be
applied automatically when a corporation has been used to
avoid surtaxes, on the other hand, they have uniformly held
that the existence of an intent to effectuate that end is a
prime and absolute requisite. Tax-saving through accumulation of profits may be evidence of the prohibited purpose, 22
but the "touchstone of liability under Sec. 102 is the purpose behind the accumulation of the income and not the consequence of the accumulation." 23 Thus it has been held that

a huge saving of individual surtaxes through the accumulation of corporate earnings is not sufficient in and of itself
to warrant the imposition of 102 without proof of the forbidden purpose.2 4 It has been decided, however, that even if
the disapproved purpose was not executed, if the intent was
present, the penalty tax is applicable, the court reasoning
that the "legislative aim no doubt was to discourage the attempt thus to misuse a corporation as well as to neutralize
success." 25
21 United Business Corp. of America, 19 B. T. A. 809, 826 (1930), aff'd, 62
F. 2d 754 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 635 (1933).
22 Cecil B. DeMille, 31 B. T. A. 1161 (1935), aff'd sub nor. Commissioner
v. Cecil B. DeMille Productions, Inc., 90 F. 2d 12 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 302
U. S. 713 (1937); Mellbank Corp., 38 B. T. A. 1108 (1938). In R. L. Blaffer
& Co., 37 B. T. A. 851 (1938), affd, 103 F. 2d 487 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 308
U. S. 576 (1939), the Board stated: "In the absence of the condemned purpose, the effect alone is no foundation for the tax. This is not to say that the
effect is of no significance, for it may, and perhaps often does, indicate the
probability of a purpose to induce it.- In ordinary life it is not unreasonable
to infer that the effect of a voluntary act is among the purposes of the actor."
Id. at 856.
23 World Pub. Co. v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 886, 889 (N. D. Okla.
1947), aff'd, 169 F. 2d 186 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 911 (1949) ;
see also KOMA, Inc. v. Commissioner, 189 F. 2d 390, 396 (10th Cir. 1951)
(It is not "decisive whether the decisions to accumulate the income and the
failure to distribute profits were wisely made.").
24 Corporate Investment Co., 40 B. T. A. 1156 (1939) (taxpayer mistakenly
thought all earnings had been distributed) ; Cecil B. De~lille, supra note 22.
25 A. D. Saenger, Inc. v. Commissioner, 84 F. 2d 23, 24 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 299 U. S. 577 (1936).
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The mere fact that in accumulating profits there are
present other motives in addition to the one of saving indi-

vidual surtaxes does not take the corporation outside the
pale of Section 102; there must be a complete absence of the
condemned purpose.20 Thus, it is not necessary that a deAlso,
sign to escape taxes be the predominant purpose.
the fact that a corporate practice was originally adopted
with no tax-saving motive in mind is not decisive, inasmuch
as its continuance might have been induced, in whole or in
part, by a desire to minimize taxes.28
Nearly all of the decisions against the taxpayer have
been on the ground that the corporation was "availed of"
for the interdicted purpose and very few have held that the
taxpayer was "formed" for such purpose.2 9 Wherever the
charge has been that the corporation was both formed and
availed of for the purpose of avoiding taxes, the courts have
usually given the bulk of their consideration to the "availed
of" charge, an adverse ruling on either charge being sufficient to penalize fully the taxpayer. The following claimed
incentives in forming corporations have been approved by
the courts: to unify various companies owned by the stockholders, to eliminate double taxation, to escape creditors, 0
28 R. L. Blaffer & Co., supra note 22. Where there is present a tax-saving
purpose, any other purposes would be "incidental" and would appear "as excuses, or afterthoughts, rather than evidence of an absence of the purpose described in the statute." Trico Products Corp., 46 B. T. A. 346, 374 (1942),
aff'd, 137 F. 2d 424 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 799 (1943).
27 Trico Products Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F. 2d 424 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 320 U. S. 799 (1943).
28 See Helvering v. Chicago Stock Yards Co., 318 U. S. 693, 699 (1943).
29 Where there has been a finding that the taxpayer was formed for the
condemned purpose, an investment or holding corporation has usually been involved, as in Beim Co. v. Landy, 113 F. 2d 897 (8th Cir. 1940), and Reynard
Corp., 37 B. T. A. 552 (1938). As a matter of fact, a statistical analysis of
all § 102 cases reveals that regardless of whether it was the "formed" or
"availed of" provision that was considered, investment and holding companies
have fared much worse than regular operating companies. Buck & Shackelford,
Retention of Earnings by Corporations Under the Income Tax Laws, 36 VA.
L. REv. 323, Appendix (1950) (the second of three published parts). It has
been held that holding companies are not limited by definition to those which
are passive, but include those which deal actively with their holdings, and that
a company which deals in speculations may nevertheless be deemed an investment company. Rands, Inc., 34 B. T. A. 1094 (1936), appeal dismissed, 101 F.
2d 1018 (6th Cir. 1939).
This case also held
30 Delaware Terminal Corp., 40 B. T. A. 1180 (1939).
that where a corporation has more than one stockholder it can not be compelled to rely, in an emergency, on those stockholders to repay any dividends
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to create and support a market for certain stock,"' to control
the principal stockholder's spending and to provide for the
possibility of selling and distributing his creations. 2
It is frequently alleged that a corporation was formed
or availed of to facilitate the handling of a stockholder's financial affairs upon his death or to avoid expected complications resulting therefrom. This sort of claim has almost
never brought success to a taxpayer. 33 However, where the
anticipated contingencies are to flow from the death of some
one other than the controlling shareholder, the courts have
been more lenient. Thus, where it was asserted that a partnership was converted into a corporation because one of the
partners feared that upon the death of his copartner the settlement of the latter's estate would require the withdrawal
of assets from the partnership, the court sustained the taxpayer's contention.3 4 Similarly, where a stockholder's interest in a certain contract would probably have been placed
in jeopardy by the death of any of the other parties interested in said contract and a corporation was formed to eliminate this risk, no penalty tax was imposed.35
Claims that the purpose of a corporation's organization
was to provide a stockholder or a relative with an occupation have usually not been sustained. 36 Evidence that a corporation was advised by lawyers or accountants that it
should not pay dividends has negated the existence of an
37
intent to avoid taxes.
received by them, thus distinguishing Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 304
U. S. 282, 294 (1938), wherein the Court stated that the taxpayer should have
paid out more of its surplus than it did since its sole stockholder would have
put the money back into the corporation if the need would have arisen for so
,doing.
31 See Trico Securities Corp., 41 B. T. A. 306 (1940).
32 See Fisher & Fisher, Inc., 32 B. T. A. 211 (1935), aff'd nere., 84 F. 2d
-996 (2d Cir. 1936).
33 See R. L. Blaffer & Co., 37 B. T. A. 851 (1938), aff'd, 103 F. 2d 487
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 576 (1939) ; Reynard Corp., 37 B. T. A. 552
(1938) ; Nipoch Corp., 36 B. T. A. 662 (1937) ; H. & L., Inc., 33 B. T. A. 857
1(1935), aff'd, 84 F. 2d 721 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 588 (1936).
34 See C. H. Spitzner & Son, Inc., 37 B. T. A. 511 (1938).
-5 See Sauk Investment Co., 34 B. T. A. 732 (1936).
-6 See H. L. Blaffer & Co., supra note 33; Rands, Inc., 34 B. T. A. 1094
.(1936), appeal dismi.ssed, 101 F. 2d 1018 (6th Cir. 1939).
37 Cf. William C. Atwater & Co., 10 T. C. 218 (1948).
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Of considerable weight, but by no means conclusive, is
the amount of personal income tax saved by reason of nonpayment of dividends by the stockholders of the corporation
sought to be penalized 8 In the leading case of Trico Products Corp,39 the Board of Tax Appeals held, in effect, that
so much was saved on personal taxes that there must have
been a purpose on the part of the corporation to avoid taxes.
However, in another case where there was little or no tax
saved by the stockholders, the penalty tax was nevertheless
levied, the court holding that the weight40to be given this fact
was within the discretion of the Board.

C. Reasonable Needs
It is obvious that if the Commissioner had the naked
burden of proving the taxpayer's intent to avert taxes, he
would be faced with a difficult task. However, the party
with the troublesome task is the taxpayer, not the Commissioner, because, as was previously stated, the statute provides that where a corporation has an accumulation "beyond
the reasonable needs of the business" it must prove by "the
clear preponderance of the evidence" an absence of the proscribed purpose. It should be remembered that the taxpayer
must also contend with the presumption that any determination of the Commissioner is correct.4 1 While it is theoretically possible for a corporation to show that though its accumulation was excessive, it did not have any wrongful
intent,4 2 almost all of the decided cases have turned on the
38 See Charleston Lumber Co. v. United States, 20 F. Supp. 83 (S. D.
W. Va.), appeal dismissed, 93 F. 2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1937); R. C. Reynolds,
Inc., 44 B. T. A. 356 (1941); Corporate Investment Co., 40 B. T. A. 1156
(1939). In each of these cases there was little or no saving in personal income
taxes and in each case the corporation was held to be exempt from the penalty
tax.
30,46 B. T. A. 346, 380 (1942), af'd, 137 F. 2d 424 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
320 U. S. 799 (1943).
40 Wilson Bros. & Co. v. Commissioner, 124 F. 2d 606 (9th Cir. 1941).
42See Olin Corp., 42 B. T. A. 1203 (1940), aff'd, 128 F. 2d 185 (7th Cir.
1942). In criticizing the use of this presumption, one author states that it "is
applied haphazardly and unevenly and can be and is a mask for the intuition
of judges and administrators when it is not actually a trap for an unlucky or
unwary taxpayer." Marcosson, The Burden of Proof in Tax Cases, 29 TAXES
221, 240 (1951).
42 "Even if it should clearly appear that the accumulations were in excess
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question of whether the accumulation was reasonably needed
by the corporation. Once the corporation proves its accumulation was reasonable, the Commissioner is almost sure to
lose, 43 although here again in theory he may still prove the
condemned purpose; 44 if the corporation cannot establish a
reasonable accumulation then it is almost certain to be the
loser.
When, prior to the Revenue Act of 1938, the existence
of an unreasonable accumulation merely created a presumption of a purpose to avoid taxes, Judge Learned Hand commented on this presumption as follows:
A statute which stands on the footing of the participants' state of
mind may need the support of presumption, indeed be practically
unenforceable without it, but the test remains the state of mind itself,
and the
presumption does no more than make the taxpayer show his
45
hand.
With the revision of the statute, the taxpayer is no longer
faced with a mere presumption, but must engage in a do-ordie effort to prove absence of an unlawful intent. Instead of
simply "showing his hand" he must strenuously seek to persuade the court that his "hand" is a good one. Generally,
in order to escape the penalty tax, the taxpayer must present
proof of a purpose to provide for business needs "so satisfyof the reasonable needs of the corporate business, section 220 [now 102] would
not apply unless it further appears that the accumulations were intentionally
permitted for the express purpose of enabling the stockholders to evade the
surtax." R. C. Tway Coal Sales Co. v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 668, 671
(W. D. Ky. 1933), aff'd, 75 F. 2d 336 (6th Cir. 1935); see World Pub. Co.
v. United States, 169 F. 2d 186, 187 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U. S.
'911 (1949).
43 It has been stated that the "fact that the surplus is not unreasonably large
in respect to the needs of the corporation's business is repugnant to the existence of such purpose [to avoid personal surtaxes], and, while not conclusive,
must be accepted as substantial evidence in denial of proofs or inferences that
it exists." United States v. R. C. Tway Coal Sales Co., 75 F. 2d 336, 337
(6th Cir. 1935).
44 The "tax may be imposed, even though the accumulation is not unreasonably large.. . ." World Pub. Co. v. United States, supra note 42, at 187. In
-United Business Corp. of America v. Commissioner, 62 F. 2d 754, 755 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U. S.635 (1933), the following observation was made:
"Ordinarily it will indeed be difficult to prove the forbidden purpose, unless the
accumulations are too large for the fair needs of the business. But it may not
-be impossible to do so. ..."
45 United Business Corp. of America v. Commissioner, supra note 44, at 755.
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ing and persuasive that it is unnecessary to look further for
a motive for the action under criticism." 46
Quite naturally it is impossible to outline any precise
set of rules that could be utilized in determining what constitutes the reasonable needs of a business. Each case must
necessarily turn on its own facts. 47 "What would be reasonable in one situation or for one business might be clearly
unreasonable in another." 48 "Prominent factors in one case
may become minor in another." 49 However, some of the
considerations that have been taken into account by the
courts in ascertaining the reasonableness of an accumulation
are as follows: the nature and volume of the corporate business, the keenness of competition, principles of good business
management, the conditions of the times, the possibilities of
harmful legislation affecting the industry, the rate of current
earnings; "c the amount of "quick assets" on hand compared
to the amount necessary to operate the business; 61 whether
minutes of meetings were kept; 52 and whether or not previous policies were conservative. 53 The decisions themselves
have frequently been inconsistent when dealing with almost
identical factual situations. Nevertheless, in the hope that
some semblance of pattern may be gleaned therefrom, there
follows a brief outline of many of the factual presentations
46 Trico Products Corp., 46 B. T. A. 346, 374 (1942), aff'd, 137 F. 2d 424
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 799 (1943).
47The answer to what are reasonable or unreasonable needs of a business
"is rarely easy to find." Dill Mfg. Co., 39 B. T. A. 1023, 1031 (1939).
48 See William C. deMille Productions, Inc., 30 B. T. A. 826, 830 (1934),
appeal and cross appeal dismissed, 80 F. 2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1936).
49 Universal Steel Co., 5 T. C. 627, 637 (1945).
50See World Pub. Co. v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 886, 894-895 (N. D.
Okla. 1947), affd, 169 F. 2d 186 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 911
(1949).
52 See United Block Co. v. Helvering, 123 F. 2d 704 (2d Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 315 U. S. 812 (1942) (Cash, notes receivable, investments, and possibly
accounts receivable were included within the meaning of "quick assets.").
52 See KOMA, Inc. v. Commissioner, 189 F. 2d 390 (10th Cir. 1951);
W. H. Gunlocke Chair Co. v. Commissioner, 145 F. 2d 791 (2d Cir. 1944);
Cecil B. DeMille, 31 B. T. A. 1161 (1935), aff'd sub nor. Commissioner v.
Cecil B. DeMille Productions, Inc., 90 F. 2d 12 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 302
U. S. 713 (1937) (minutes corroborated claimed purpose).
5 See Dill Mfg. Co., 39 B. T. A. 1023 (1939). But see W. H. Gunlocke
Chair Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 52, wherein the taxpayer had a certain
surplus in 1930, which decreased steadily from 1930 to 1933 because of the
depression, but was gained back by the end of the taxable year 1939 and nevertheless held to have been unreasonably accumulated.
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that have been submitted to the courts and their decisions in
respect thereto.
In general, where there is a clear-cut need to purchase
new equipment, reserves for such purpose have been sanctioned by the courts. 4 Also, fluctuating economic conditions, particularly those brought about by wars or depressions, have frequently been recognized by the courts as a
valid reason for accumulating profits. 5 However, in Cribb&
SCoxo, Inc. v. Commissioner,56 the contention that reserves
were needed for an inevitable conversion from wartime to
peacetime conditions was not accepted by the court. Likewise, the court found for the Commissioner in the face of an
assertion that retention of surplus had been necessitated by
shortages in materials and other uncertainties caused by
57
war.
A persistently approved reason for the accumulation of
profits is a desire on the part of corporations to become independent, either production-wise or financial-wise.5 8 However, where a corporation has as its aim the improvement
of its financial position through assistance to allied companies or other organizations in which it has an interest, the
courts have not been prone to side with the taxpayer. Thus,
in Helvering v. Chicago Stock Yards Co., 59 where the taxpayer's claim was that it had accumulated profits in order
54 See Universal Steel Co., 5 T. C. 627 (1945).
5 See Industrial Bankers Securities Corp. v. Higgins, 104 F. 2d 177 (2d

Cir. 1939) (business bad because of depression); Charleston Lumber Co. v.
United States, 20 F. Supp. 83 (S. D. W. Va.), appeal dismissed, 93 F. 2d 1018
(4th Cir. 1937) (lumber market poor); J. L. Goodman Furniture Co., 11 T. C.
530 (1948) (expected post-war furniture boom) ; Lion Clothing Co., 8 T. C.
1181 (1947) (fear of depression) ; Universal Steel Co., supra note 54 (period
of changing government controls); General Smelting Co., 4 T. C. 313 (1944)
(expected metal business expansion due to war); Delaware Terminal Corp.,
40 B. T. A. 1180 (1939) (depression hazards); Mellbank Corp., 38 B. T. A.
1108 (1938) (bank depression).
56 147 F. 2d 60 (2d Cir. 1945).
57 World Pub. Co. v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 886 (N. D. Okla. 1947),
aff'd, 169 F. 2d 186 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 911 (1949)
(surplus far in excess of previously-anticipated needs).
58 See Industrial Bankers Securities Corp. v. Higgins, supra note 55; Lion
Clothing Co., supra note 55; Cecil B. DeMille, 31 B. T. A. 1161 (1935), aff'd
sub ,oin. Commissioner v. Cecil B. DeMille Productions, Inc., 90 F. 2d 12
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 713 (1937). However, in Gibbs & Cox, Inc.
v. Conmmissioner, supra note 56, the court rejected the claim that the taxpayer
desired to become independent of financing supplied by outside sources.
59 318 U. S. 693 (1943).
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to first pay off its holding company's debts and then to gain
control over and liquidate it, the Commissioner's 102 assessment was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States.
The result was the same where a corporation maintained that
it needed funds to "finance" another company in order that
it would not lose its investment in it, the Board holding that
the business of the other company "was not the business of
the taxpayer." 60 Where a taxpayer and another newspaper
had merged their operating facilities and each agreed to pay
one-half of the purchase price of a badly needed new press,
but where it was apparent that the taxpayer would have to
advance the full amount at the outset (and in fact ultimately
did), the court, nevertheless, held that a reserve to cover the
other newspaper's one-half was not part of taxpayer's reasonable business needs."' However, in Mellbank Corp.,62 a
retention of surplus to safeguard the taxpayer's investments
in the stock of its member banks was not disapproved by the
Board.
The following miscellaneous situations have been accepted as valid excuses for the non-payment of dividends:
the contingency that taxpayer's only customer might be lost
and the-prospect of moving its plant or opening a new one
in another part of the country; 63 taxpayer's business was
very risky; 64 the capital retained was less than was necessary for three months' operation; 65 an existing agreement
with a bank not to declare dividends until certain loans were
repaid and the necessity of having to borrow money for the
payment of any dividends; 66 an expected increase in business; 67 a plan to establish branch stores; 68 a desire to purchase certain merchandising concessions and the necessity of
60 Keck Investment Co., 29 B. T. A. 143, 149 (1933), aff'd, 77 F. 2d 244
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 633 (1935).
"1World Pub. Co. v. United States, supra note 57.
62 38
63

B. T. A. 1108 (1938).

See L. R. Teeple Co., 47 B. T. A. 270 (1942).

But see Eastern Ry. &

Lumber Co., 12 T. C. 869 (1949).
64 See Seaboard Security Co., 38 B. T. A. 560 (1938) ; Cecil B. DeMille,
31 B. T. A. 1161 (1935), aff'd mb norn. Commissioner v. Cecil B. DeMille
Productions, Inc., 90 F. 2d 12 (9th'Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 713 (1937).
65 See Universal Steel Co., 5 T. C. 627 (1945).
66 See Trico Securities Corp., 41 B. T. A. 306 (1940).
67 See C. H. Spitzner & Son, Inc., 37 B. T. A. 511 (1938).
68 See J. L. Goodman Furniture Co., 11 T. C. 530 (1948).
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increasing taxpayer's inventory; 69 a fear that an important
contract would not be completed or would not be renewed; 70
and the pendency of adverse legislation. 7 1
The following stated intents in withholding dividends
have been unsuccessfully urged by corporations seeking to
be exempted from the 102 penalty: to meet the possibility
that certain financial aid would be discontinued and the risk
of liability arising from the negligence of taxpayer's employees;72 to erect a theater in the event a certain lease
would not be renewed; 73 to make up for the loss of business
that would ensue upon the expiration of an important patent and to protect the financial interests of certain stockholders; 74 to prosecute or defend against possible patent infringement suits and to raise the book value of the corporate
stock to approximate its market value in order to protect
the public; 75 to develop an invention; 7 and to provide
against the recurrence of boycotts.7 7
D.

Undefined or Future Needs

Adding to the taxpayer's already stiff task of defending
against charges of Section 102 violation is the principle laid
down in some of the decisions that the excess capital must
not only be for a specific and definite need, 78 but such need
must be "immediate or reasonably immediate." 70 The need
69 See Lion Clothing Co., 8 T. C. 1181 (1947).
70 See Fisher & Fisher, Inc., 32 B. T. A. 211 (1935), aff'd mein., 84 F. 2d

996 (2d Cir. 1936). But see Reynard Corp., 37 B. T. A. 552 (1938).
71 See Seaboard Security Co., 38 B. T. A. 560 (1938). But see Albert L.
Allen Co., 3 CCH 1944 TC MEm. DEc. 1246 (1944) (adverse legislation in
rumor stage).
72 See Gibbs & Cox, Inc. v. Commissioner, 147 F. 2d 60 (2d Cir. 1945).
3 See Twin City Theatres, P-H 1952 TC MEm. DEc. 152,133 (1952).
4 See Trico Products Corp. 46 B. T. A. 346 (1942), affd, 137 F. 2d 424
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U. . 799 (1943).
75 See Trico Products Corp. v. McGowan, 67 F. Supp. 311 (W. D. N. Y.
1946), aff'd, 169 F. 2d 343 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 899 (1948).
76 See Semagraph Co. v. Commissioner, 152 F. 2d 62 (4th Cir. 1945).
7 See Wilkerson Daily Corp., Ltd., 42 B. T. A. 1266 (1940), aff'd, 125
F. 2d 998 (9th Cir. 1942).
7s See Trico Products Corp. v. McGowan, supra note 75, at 318 (by
implication).
79 Eastern Ry. & Lumber Co., 12 T. C. 869, 875 (1949); accord, World
Pub. Co. v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 886 (N. D. Okla. 1947), aff'd, 169 F.
2d 186 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 911 (1949).
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must be "associated with business in hand." 80 In Semagraph Co.,81 the court indicated that there must be "substantial proof of a specific plan, objective or contingency which,
in the exercise of good business judgment, demanded the accumulation of the earnings and profits in a reasonable and
reasonably definite amount." 82 In World Publishing Company v. United States,3 the taxpayer in 1942 and 1943 (the
taxable years in question) badly needed certain equipment
and a building plant but was unable to purchase the same
because World War II was in progress at the time. In holding that a reserve for the stated needs was unreasonable, the
court laid stress on the fact that there was no possibility of
being able to buy the equipment or the plant until the war
ended and that the "company's expansion program lay in the
indefinite post-war future." 84 This and similar decisions
certainly seem unjust to the taxpayer. Common sense decries against the implication of these rulings that future
needs, though known today, must be taken care of by future
earnings. Furthermore, is a corporation to be allowed nothing for "a rainy day"? Granted that where a substantial
surplus exists a mere claim that the same is needed for contingencies that are unexpected and unforeseeable should not
result in getting the taxpayer off the Commissioner's hook;
nevertheless, the doctrine that the corporate need must be
specific, definite and immediate is beyond a doubt arbitrary
and wholly unfair to the taxpayer and certainly militates
against the use of sound business principles.
E.

Loans to Stockholders

Another factor which has played a prominent part in
the downfall of the taxpayer in Section 102 cases is loans
so McCutchin Drilling Co. v. Commissioner, 143 F. 2d 480, 482 (5th Cir.
1944).
813 CCH 1944 TC MEm. DEc. 812 (1944), aff'd, 152 F. 2d 62 (4th Cir.

1945).

82 Id. at 815.

Supra note 79. This case has been referred to as "probably the most
extreme case against the taxpayer on the books." Cary, Section 102 May Not
Be the Menace Some Tax Men Consider It To Be, 89 J. ACCOUNTANCY 219,
221 (1950).
84 World Pub. Co. v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 886, 893 (N. D. Okla.
1947), aff'd, 169 F. 2d 186 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 911 (1949).
83
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made by the corporation to its stockholders.8 5 In United
8 the
Business Corporation of America v. Commissioner,"
court held that such loans are "incompatible with a purpose to strengthen the financial position of the petitioner
[taxpayer], but entirely accord with a desire to get the
equivalent of his [a stockholder's] dividends under another
guise." 87 Similarly, in KOMA, Inc. v. Commissioner" the
court held that where a corporation made loans to its stockholders at normal rates but did not require the payment of
interest, this "in substance gave the stockholders the benefit
of a declared dividend without the attendant tax burden resulting from a dividend payment." I9 However, it is very
important to note that where the shareholders have paid interest and the loans have not weakened the corporate financial picture, the loans have usually been approved by the
courts. 90 Nevertheless, where the borrower would not have
been able to get a loan from a prudent lender, the corporation was penalized despite the borrower's willingness to pay
higher interest than banks would pay. 91 Even the fact that
the loans are secured may not be enough to swing the case
in favor of the taxpayer. 92
In one case it was held that though loans to stockholders
were not legitimate business purposes, insurance to recoup
on such loans was permissible.93 Loans to individuals who
are not the majority stockholders have generally been sanctioned.94 Where loans by the stockholders exceeded in
amount loans to the stockholders, the corporation was not
taxed under Section 102.95 Decisions dealing with non85 See William C. deMille Productions, Inc., 30 B. T. A. 826 (1934),
appeal and cross appeal dismissed, 80 F. 2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1936) (good illustration of how decisive such loans frequently are).
8662 F. 2d 754 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 635 (1933).
87 Id. at 755.
88 189 F. 2d 390 (10th Cir. 1951).
89 Id. at 396.
00 See Corporate Investment Co., 40 B. T. A. 1156 (1939).
91 See Wilkerson Daily Corp., 42 B. T. A. 1266 (1940), affd, 125 F. 2d

998 (9th Cir. 1942).

92 See United Business Corp. of America, 19 B. T. A. 809 (1930), af'd, 62
F. 2d 754 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 635 (1933).
93 See General Smelting Co., 4 T. C. 313 (1944).
94 See R. C. Reynolds, Inc., 44 B. T. A. 356 (1941).
95 See C. H. Spitzner & Son, Inc., 37 B. T. A. 511 (1938).
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interest bearing loans to executors of deceased stockholders6
have not produced any particular rule for that type of case.
There have been several decisions departing from the
general rule with rather unconvincing explanations being
given therefor. For example, where the chief stockholder
borrowed large sums, which he did not repay, the penalty
tax was not imposed because said stockholder had no responsibility in the management of the corporation." Also, where
the corporation obtained bank loans and delivered the money
to stockholders, who did not make repayment, no tax was
levied, apparently on the ground that the corporation was
a mere front for the stockholders in obtaining the bank
loans.98
F.

Reinvestment of Surplus

The manner in which surplus funds have been reinvested
poses a ticklish question--one with which the courts have
had a great deal of trouble. It has been asserted that the
statute does "not contemplate that a business should remain
static" 09 and that "it must be assumed that any business
shall have the right to grow." 100 It is obvious, however,
that if any and all reinvestment of earnings were to be upheld, then Section 102 would soon be a useless piece of legislation. The question is where the line of demarcation should
be drawn. Where investment or holding companies are involved 101 or where the reinvestment (particularly when in
the contemplation stage) is in a field unrelated to the busi96 See Irvington Investments Co., 32 B. T. A. 1165 (1935) (taxpayer lent
money to executors to pay inheritance taxes and no penalty was imposed);
Whitney Chain & Mfg. Co., 3 T. C. 1109 (1944), aff'd, 149 F. 2d 936 (2d Cir.
1945) (taxpayer lent money to stockholder's estate for purpose of paying
taxes and other claims and penalty tax was imposed on the ground that among
other plans a dividend could have been declared conditioned upon its return to
the taxpayer in liquidation of the loan).
9' Fisher & Fisher, Inc., 32 B. T. A. 211 (1935), aff'd nem., 84 F. 2d 996
(2d Cir. 1936).
98 See R. C. Tway Coal Sales Co. v. United States, 75 F. 2d 336 (6th Cir.

1935).

99 William C. deMille Productions, Inc., 30 B. T. A. 826, 830 (1934),
appeal and cross appeal dismissed, 80 F. 2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1936).
200 Ibid.
101 See Beim Co. v. Landy, 113 F. 2d 897 (8th Cir. 1940); Almours Securities, Inc. v. Commissioner, 91 F. 2d 427 (5th Cir. 1937), cert. denied,
302 U. S. 765 (1938).
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ness of the corporation, the courts have generally found
against the taxpayer. 10 2 Carried to its ultimate, this "would
mean that funds could not be retained to branch out into
any venture afield from the existing enterprise of a taxpayer," 103 a consequence that would be exceedingly undesirable. Moreover, in determining what constitutes a related
field, the courts have been rather harsh on the taxpayer. For
example, in World Publishing Company v'. United States,
supra, the court held that it was unreasonable for a newspaper to acquire a surplus for the purpose of purchasing a
radio station, disregarding the fact that it has been a frequent and customary practice for newspapers to make such
acquisitions. However, where investments in a foreign field
were made in order to promote business for the company,
such investments were upheld.1 04 Investments by a loan
company in securities and real estate in order to bolster its
credit rating were also sustained. 10 5 Furthermore, where an
accumulation of earnings is necessary, though temporarily
the funds cannot be used in the business, investments in unrelated fields will be sanctioned, provided said investments
can be readily liquidated for use in the business. Thus, in
C. H. Spitzner & Son, Inc.,10 the Board maintained that
"[c]ommon sense required that the inactive funds [of a
tobacco company] be employed as profitably as they might
be. So it is not surprising that they were invested in income
producing securities." 107
102 See J. M. Perry & Co. v. Commissioner, 120 F. 2d 123 (9th Cir. 1941)
(investments by storage company in mining stock and real estate); Southland Industries, Inc., 5 CCH 1946 TC MEM. DEC. 950 (1946) (radio broadcasting company desired to enter into merchandising field). But see Fisher
& Fisher, Inc., 32 B. T. A. 211 (1935), aff'd mem., 84 F. 2d 996 (2d Cir.
1936) (corporation formed for purpose of promoting chief stockholder's
cartoons invested heavily in said stockholder's real estate and racing and
breeding stables).
103Holzman, What's New in 102?, 25 TAXES 101, 107 (1947).
10 4Charleston Lumber Co. v. United States. 20 F. Supp. 83 (S. D.
W. Va.), appeal dimnissed. 93 F. 2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1937).
1o See Seaboard Security Co., 38 B. T. A. 560 (1938).
10637 B. T. A. 511 (1938).
107 Id. at 521; accord, Cecil B. DeMille, 31 B. T. A. 1161 (1935),
aff'd
sub noin. Commissioner v. Cecil B. DeMille Productions, Inc., 90 F. 2d 12
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 713 (1937) (motion picture company
invested in securities, real estate and numerous varied enterprises, many of
which had little or no relation to the motion picture business).
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Effect of Shrinkcage of Assets

A frequently claimed justification for withholding dividends is shrinkage in the taxpayer's paid-in capital by reason
of depreciation in value of its capital assets. Such claims
have not been received very sympathetically by the courts,
particularly where investment or holding companies have
been involved.' 0 8 Therefore, where a company is earning
profits it must, under Section 102 rulings, pay out dividends
even though its assets may be dwindling in value at a greater
rate than profits are being realized. Here again the rulings
of the court seem to collide with and penalize the exercise
of sound business judgment. In referring to a taxpayer's
shrunken assets, the Board in C. H. Spitzner & Son, Inc.,
supra, stated that they "would be useful to the business only
to the extent of their actual market values. The fact that
they cost a greater amount would not benefit the business.
...

Business men and bankers, worthy of those names, would

not have regarded it [the retained fund] as a surplus." 109
Unfortunately, this decision has not been followed, but has
been minimized to a great extent by the opinion in Helvering
v. National Grocery Co.,11 wherein the United States Supreme Court sustained the imposition of a 102 penalty, despite a gigantic shrinkage in assets caused by the late depression, by holding that this was merely evidence which the
Board and the Commissioner might consider in determining
whether or not the accumulation exceeded the reasonable
business needs.
The problem of shrinkage becomes even more acute
when, due to depreciation of its assets, the company becomes
insolvent and is prohibited by statute from declaring dividends. It would seem that under such circumstances a fail108 See A. D. Saenger, Inc. v. Commissioner, 84 F. 2d 23 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 299 U. S. 577 (1936); Suffolk Se'hrities Corp., 41 B. T. A. 1161
(1940), aff'd
nem.,
128 F. 2d 743 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S.
700 (1943); A. & J., Inc., 38 B. T. A. 1248 (1938); Nipoch Corp., 36
B. T. A. 662 (1937); Rands, Inc., 34 B. T. A. 1094 (1936), appeal dismissed, 101 F. 2d 1018 (6th Cir. 1939). But see Commissioner v. W. S.
Farish & Co., 104 F. 2d 833 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 559 (1939)

(impairment of paid-in capital due to an operating deficit).
109 C. H. Spitzner & Son, Inc., 37 B. T. A. 511, 517-518 (1938).
110 304 U. S. 282 (1938).
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ure to declare dividends would be permissible. However, in
one case the taxpayer was penalized for failure to declare
dividends when to do so would have been a clear violation
of a Texas statute. It was declared that, inasmuch as personal guaranties had been given by the principal stockholder,
no one could have been harmed by a violation of that law. 111
In another case, the taxpayer was advised by its attorney and
accountants that a payment of dividends would have been in
violation of Section 58 of the New York Stock Corporation
Law, prohibiting the payment of dividends impairing capital,
and Section 664 of the New York Penal Law, providing that
a director acquiescing in such payment is guilty of a misdemeanor." 2 Though the issue is outlined by the court in
its statement of the facts, its failure to do more than mention it in the opinion is regrettable. When there is a statutory mandate against declaring dividends, compliance therewith assuredly should not result in the imposition of a 102
penalty and the courts should not be reluctant to so state.
H. The Judgment of the Directors
Whereas in stockholder suits, the judgment of the
directors in not declaring dividends is normally accepted
by the courts,"13 the rule is otherwise in Section 102
-12 See R. L. Blaffer & Co., 37 B. T. A. 851 (1938), aff'd, 103 F. 2d 487
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 576 (1939) ; see also A. & J., Inc., 38 B. T. A.
1248 (1938).
112 See William C. Atwater & Co., Inc., 10 T. C. 218 (1948) ; see also C. H.
Spitzner & Son, Inc., 37 B. T. A. 511 (1938), wherein taxpayer was informed
by its attorney that any distribution of dividends would impair capital, rendering
the officers and directors liable civilly and criminally for their action.
23 New York, L. E. & W. R. 1_ v. Nickals, 119 U. S. 296, 304 (1886). In
Williams v. Western Union Tel. Co., 93 N. Y. 162, 192 (1883), the court commented as follows: "When a corporation has a surplus, whether a dividend
shall be made, and if made, how much it shall be, and when and where it shall
be payable, rest in the fair and honest discretion of the directors uncontrollable
by the courts."

In 11

FLTCHER

Cyc. PRIvAER Coin. 808-811 (Rev. perm. ed.

1932) we find the following language: "The mere fact that a corporation has
surplus profits out of which a dividend might lawfully be declared is not of itself sufficient ground for a court of equity to compel the directors to make a
dividend, for they have a right to use surplus profits to extend the business of
the corporation, or to make improvements, and even to provide a surplus fund, if
it is to the interests of the corporation to do so, and a court of equity will not
interfere with or control their discretion in determining what the interests of
the corporation require in this respect, unless there is a clear abuse of discretion, or the action taken by the directors is unreasonable and oppressive.
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cases.11 In the World Publishing case previously referred
to, the court stated as follows: "While the directors are entitled to exercise their judgment upon the question [of reasonable needs] ... the determination is truly a judicial question... to be decided in the light of the circumstances and
the applicable rules." -15 Again, in Trico Products Corp.,
supra.,the Board reached the same conclusion in the following language: "We can not satisfy ourselves that our function would be performed merely by accepting the decision
of petitioner's [taxpayer's] interested officers in the place
of our independent judgment as to what was reasonably
necessary to protect petitioner's future position." 116
We see then that though the identical issue is involved,
in non-tax cases the judgment of the directors in retaining
earnings is accorded great weight, but that in 102 cases it
is lightly regarded. The courts exercise their own judgment
in tax cases, independent of that of the directors. 1 7 In the
World Publishing case, where the taxpayer's presses were
"The power of the directors is absolute if they act in the exercise of an
honest judgment, and earnings of prosperous years may help out the deficiencies
of other years."
114 There are several notable exceptions to this statement. Thus in R. C.
-way Coal Sales Co. v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 668, 671 (W. D. Ky. 1933),
aff'd, 75 F. 2d 336 (6th Cir. 1935), the following recognition is given the discretionary powers of directors: "Necessarily, the directors and officers of a
corporation must be given, even in federal tax matters, some discretion and
some latitude as to what constitutes the reasonable needs of the corporate business. It may well be doubted if the federal government, for the purpose of
increasing its taxes, can absolutely destroy or arbitrarily limit this discretion
resting in the directors of a corporation organized under state law." And in
Dill Mfg. Co., 39 B. T. A. 1023, 1031 (1939), there is this concession:
"... we will hesitate before substituting our judgment upon the reasonableness
of the corporate accumulations, for that of the directors."
115 72 F. Supp. 886, 894 (N. D. Okla. 1947), aff'd, 169 F. 2d 186 (10th Cir.
1948), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 911 (1949).
11646 B. T. A. 346, 375 (1942), aff'd, 137 F. 2d 424 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
320 U. S. 799 (1943).
117 In dealing with a corporation whose business was trading in securities,
the Board in Rands, Inc., 34 B. T. A. 1094, 1103 (1936), appeal dismissed, 101
F. 2d 1018 (6th Cir. 1939), remarked: "The reasonable needs of the business
are not to be regarded as controlled by the judgment of a stock trader, or even
of a student of the market, as to the amount necessary to survive a sudden drop
in the market or to take advantage of a rise." Along similar lines is the statement in United Block Co. v. Helvering, 9 P-H 1940 BTA MEm. DEC. f 40,575
(1940), af'd, 123 F. 2d 704 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U. S. 812 (1942) :
"The question is not whether in the judgment of the officers the dividends declared were reasonable, but whether the accumulation of earnings was to any
extent beyond the reasonable needs of the business."
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operating at 50% of capacity but new equipment could not
be purchased because of wartime conditions, the court held
that the decision of the directors to retain a cash reserve for
the purchase of the same was unreasonable on the ground,
among others, that the company's prospects of earnings were
good and should have been relied on for the necessary purchases. The court here clearly substituted its own judgment
for that of men intimately acquainted with the business and
who were responsible for its efficient operation. It is obvious that the discretion recognized in stockholder suits as
belonging primarily to the directors has now been claimed
by the courts when the Commissioner is the complainant.
There is no real justification for this shift and it is but another illustration of the many oppressive innovations with
which the tax litigant is compelled to cope.
We also find in the decisions such statements as: "directors may be more conservative than the statute permits" 118
(thereby incurring a 102 penalty) and "[t]he corporate exercise of judgment must succumb whenever it conflicts with
the governmental policy as enacted by the Congress." 19
The statute hardly justifies such utterances, as there is no
intimation found therein of a purpose to curtail a cautious
exercise of discretion by a board of directors. So far as the
provisions of the statute are concerned, a board may be as
conservative as it pleases and still not be penalized. Of
course, the frequently severe manner in which the section
has been applied by the courts makes conservative policies
extremely hazardous. Emphasizing tax acquisition rather
than prevention of tax avoidance, the United States Supreme
Court has stated that the purpose of Section 102 is "to compel the company to distribute any profits not needed for the
conduct of its business ....
, 120 In describing this as inconsistent with other statements in the same opinion, one
writer correctly points out that "[t] his construction appears

I's Trico Products Corp. v. McGowan, 67 F. Supp. 311, 319 (W. D. N. Y.
1946), aff'd, 169 F. 2d 343 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 899 (1948).
119,World Pub. Co. v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 886, 894 (N. D. Okla.
1947),
aff'd, 169 F. 2d 186 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 911 (1949).
0
12 Helvering v. Chicago Stock Yards Co., 318 U. S. 693, 699 (1943).
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to disregard purpose as a test of taxability," 121 as indeed do
the two quotations at the opening of this paragraph.
I.

Subsequent Events

Events subsequent to the withholding of funds have been
of great aid to the courts in determining the reasonableness
of corporate reserves. 122 Of course, "[s]ubsequent events
are relevant only as they throw light on the period in question." 123 If it can be proven that the funds were in fact
expended for the purpose for which they were allegedly re1 24
tained, then the court will usually find for the taxpayer.
However, if the corporation cannot establish that the asserted plan was actualized, then, in the absence of a satisfactory
explanation, 125 the Commissioner will be victorious. 126 But
apparent fulfillment of a claimed intention does not always
result in an exemption for the taxpayer. In the World Publishing case not only did the taxpayer in 1945 enter into a
contract for the items which it could not obtain because of
the war in 1942 and 1943 (the taxable years), but its reserves for the purchase of said items were substantially
below their ultimate cost; 127 yet, the corporation was penalized under Section 102.128 Also, in the Trico Products case
the Board rejected an assertion that subsequent use of a retained fund was contemplated at the time the decision was
made to withhold dividends.
121Austin, Section 102 and Capital Gains, 26 TAxEs 302, 305 (1948)
122 Trico Products Corp., 46 B. T. A. 346, 380 (1942), aff'd, 137 F. 2d 424
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 799 (1943) : ". .. as bearing upon purpose,
we may look to the history following" the taxable period in issue.
123 KOMA, Inc. v. Commissioner, 189 F. 2d 390, 396 (10th Cir. 1951).
22 4 See Coca Cola Bottling Works v. United States, 53 F. Supp. 992 (M. D.
Tenn. 1944); General Smelting Co., 4 T. C. 313 (1944).
225 See Wilkerson Daily Corp., 42 B. T. A. 1266 (1940), aff'd, 125 F. 2d 998
(9th Cir. 1942).
126 See United Block Co. v. Helvering, 123 F. 2d 704 (2d Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 315 U. S. 812 (1942) (claimed contemplated purchase not made until
two years later and under new management) ; J. M. Perry & Co. v. Commissioner, 120 F. 2d 123 (9th Cir. 1941) (claimed contemplated repairs never
made).
127 See World Pub. Co. v. United States, 169 F. 2d 186, 190, 191 (10th Cir.
1948) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 911 (1949).
128In Whitney Chain & Mfg. Co.. 3 T. C. 1109 (1944), aff'd, 149 F. 2d 936
(2d Cir. 1945), a retention of $70,000 for an anticipated expansion caused by
the war was held to be unreasonable, despite the fact that approximately
$582,000 was ultimately expended.
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J. Efficacy of Appeal
Once the Tax Court has determined Section 102 to be
applicable, the chances of a reversal by the Court of Appeals are negligible, 129 because a finding that the taxpayer
was formed or availed of for the prohibited purpose involves
a question of fact which, if supported by substantial evidence, is binding on the latter court.1 30 In Gibbs & Coo,
Inc. v. Commissioner, supra, it was stated as follows-: "The
scope of judicial review in a case of this character [i.e., involving Section 102] is extremely limited . .. . The inferences which the Tax Court has drawn from the undisputed
primary facts cannot be upset, unless arbitrary, merely because in the exercise of an independent judgment we might
draw different inferences as to the reasonable needs" 131 of
the taxpayer's business.
Even where the government called no witnesses and the
taxpayer's evidence was not contradicted,
an appeal by the
13 2
taxpayer was ultimately to no avail.
III.

PROBLEMS CREATED BY SECTION 102

Even a cursory analysis of Section 102 cases reveals
that a considerable number of them are inconsistent, while
others are irreconcilable. However, one conclusion is inescapable: an accumulation beyond the ordinary by a closely
held corporation is extremely perilous under almost any
circumstances.
129In Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489 (1943), the rule was laid
down that a finding of fact by the Tax Court if supported by the record is not
subject to appellate review. However, this rule was practically obliterated in
1948 when INT. Rav. CODE § 1141(a) was amended so as to make the Tax
Court subject to the same type of review to which district courts are subject,
i.e., findings of fact as well as findings of law may be scrutinized. With the
departure of the Dobson rule, the opinion was expressed that reversals of Tax
Court rulings in § 102 cases would become more frequent. LASSER & HOLZMAN,
CoRroRATE AccuMuLA.AONS ANi SECroN 102 153 (1949). However, such has

not been the case thus far.
130 Cf. Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 304 U. S. 282 (1938) ; Olin Corp.
v. Commissioner, 128 F. 2d 185 (7th Cir. 1942); Commissioner v. Cecil B.
DeMille Productions, Inc., 90 F. 2d 12 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 713

(1937).
131 147 F. 2d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1945).
232 See National Grocery Co. v. Helvering, 92 F. 2d 931 (3d Cir. 1937),
red, 304 U. S.282 (1938).
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Some tax experts feel that, on the whole, the courts have
been rather tolerant of the taxpayer in 102 cases. 13 3 Regardless of whether or not this conclusion is warranted, 3 4 such
cases as World Publishing Company v. United States completely dispel any reassurance that might otherwise be forthcoming from the decisions. The Bureau of Internal Revenue
itself has repeatedly insisted that the statute will be interpreted and applied fairly, 1 35 and a few writers are of the
opinion that it actually has shown more than customary
leniency. 13 6 Nevertheless, on every corporation return filed,
the Bureau now requires its agents to make a specific finding
as to the applicability of Section 102 and special attention
is to be given to any corporation which has failed to distribute more than 70% of its excess earnings in the taxable
year. 3 7 In any event, the general consensus of those in the
tax field seems to be that strict enforcement of the statute
1 88
is sought.
However, the major evil of the statute is not the tax consequences that have thus far been incurred, though certainly
they have been disastrous enough for some companies, but

See Cary, Section 102 May Not Be the Menace Some Tax Men Consider
It To Be, 89 J. AcCOUNTANCY 219, 220 (1950) ; Cary, Accumulations Beyond
the Reasonable Needs of the Business: The Dilemma of Section 102(c), 60
H, v. L. REv. 1282, 1297 (1947).
234 There have been only a little more than 100 reported cases dealing with
§ 102 and its predecessors, approximately half of which have been in favor of
the Commissioner and half in favor of the taxpayer. "This seeming lack of
judicial attention attracted by the Section . . . deceives no well-informed corporate director as to its importance." Buck & Shackelford, Retention of Earnings by Corporations Under the Income Tax Laws, 36 VA. L. REv. 323 (1950)
(second of three published parts). This article contains an exceptionally fine
statistical compilation of § 102 cases.
135 KNAPP & WARREN, FORMS OF BusiNEss ORGANIZATION AND THE FEDERAL
TAX LAWS 23 (Rev. ed. 1951).
136 See Miller, Bureau Policy on Section 102, 6 N. Y. U. ANN. INST. FED.

TAX. 975 (1948), wherein it is pointed out that an average of less than 100
deficiency notices a year under § 102 were issued for the'period from '1939 to
1947.
137 T.
D. 4914, 1939-2 Cum. BuLL. 108, amended by T. D. 5398, 1944 Cum.
BuLL. 194. The adoption of such policies were considered to be an indication
that § 102 would be more vigorously enforced (Bock, Tax Problems of Small
Business, 25 TAXES 142, 144 (1947)) and that a "get tough" policy would be
exercised (Buck & Shackelford, Retention of Earnings by Corporations Un er
the Income Tax Laws, 36 VA. L. RFv. 141, 182 (1950) [the first of three
published partsl).
138 See 2 CCH 1952 FED. TAx REP. W677.023.
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rather it is the "powerful silent pressure" 139 exerted by the
statute on small corporations compelling them to declare
dividends against wiser business judgment. 140 The Bureau
has followed no consistent policy 141 and it is impossible 142
to
foresee what test or line of attack will be employed by it.
Nor do the decisions reveal any safe guide for the boards of
directors. 143 With the potentiality of the statute thus unlimited, many directors are unwilling to gamble on how the
authorities will view a decision to retain earnings and are
44
thus coerced into a distribution of dividends.
For those directors who have made an honest decision
to withhold dividends, it is certainly frustrating to have a
visitation from a revenue agent who, having no familiarity
with, nor responsibility in the business, and with the benefit
of hindsight, will decide whether or not their action was
reasonable. 1 45 Obviously, it is both "absurd and unjust" 14'
that a disinterested agent should be free to make a decision
of this type. Revenue officers are not selected for the purpose of passing upon the financial needs of a corporation and
have not the background or experience to do so.147 It may
be added that the courts are likewise usually ill-equipped to
make a dogmatic pronouncement concerning what are or are
not the reasonable needs of a business. Until the judgment
of the directors is elevated from the position of inferiority
139 Lowrimore, The Penalty Surtax under Section 102, 29 TAXES 215, 219
(1951), quoting from the report of the Committee on Federal Taxation of the
American Institute of Accountants submitted to the Eighty-first Congress in
April, 1950.
140 Ibid. See also Holzman, Impact of the War's End on Section 102, 24
TAxEs 24, 28 (1946), in which it is reported that a poll of corporations (Effects
of Taxes Upon Corporate Policy, National Industrial Conference Board) indicated that because of § 102 many of them "felt obliged to make larger distributions than prudence dictated . . ." and considered the statute "a direct
deterrent to productive activity."
141 See Miller, supra note 136, at 976.
142 See Cary, Section 102 May Not Be the Menace Some Tax Men Consider
It To Be, 89 J. ACCOUNTANCY 219 (1950).
143 "Section 102 is a strange branch of tax law. The courts can clarify little
in it that will have wide application to other cases." Landman, Concepts of
Section 102, 26 TAXES 19, 26 (1948).
144 See Turner, Unreasonable Accumulatiom of Surplus . . . Section 102, 26
TAXES 839, 843 (1948).
14. See Lowrimore, supra note 139. at 219.
246 Turner, supra note 144, at 843.
147 See Ballantine, Psychological Bases for Tax Liability, 27 HARV. Bus.
Ray. 200, 205 (1949).
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which it now occupies in the eyes of the authorities, it may
be expected that enforcement of 102 will continue to be
erratic and unpredictable.
Since an unfavorable reaction by the Commissioner is
not likely to be manifested until more than two years after
the taxable year, and a court decision upholding that reaction may require an additional two years thereafter, the danger under the statute is greater than appears at first glance.
If it is ultimately determined that funds were unreasonably
retained, then an unsuspecting continuance of that policy
during the intervening years is almost certain to meet the
same fate. Of course, if a corporation distributes all its current year's earnings there can be no penalty despite the fact
that its surplus, built up by prior years' earnings, is more
than adequate for its needs.
All of the decided cases have apparently dealt with corporations controlled either by a sole stockholder or by a
small group of stockholders. In Trico Products Corp. v.
Commissioner, supra, there were approximately 2,200 stockholders involved, but a group of six owned almost 74% of the
stock. Some writers have opined that with the advent of
this case the government would seek to penalize corporations
that were even more widely held. 148 However, thus far the
contention that "except in the rarest instance the section
obviously has application only to close corporations" 149
would seem to be a sound one. The difficulty in endeavoring
to prove tax avoidance where the corporation is publicly
held is evident. That small corporations are thus necessarily the target of Section 102 is unfortunate. For one
thing, it is very difficult for small companies, particularly
those in the growing stage, to obtain outside capital'150 and
often they are forced to retain earnings in order to survive.
Statistics show that "profitable small -firms on the average
pay out a smaller percentage of income as dividends and
earn a higher rate of profit on net worth than do large corporations, and that their retained earnings normally consti148 See Turner, supra note 144, at 843.
149 Barrett, The Section 102 Penalty, 24 TAxEs 656 (1946).
150 See Bock, supra note 137, at 144.
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tute a much larger percentage of their net worth and of total
assets." 151 As a matter of fact, so far as small corporations
are concerned, the Treasury Department's own statistics contradict its rule-of-thumb requirement that a 70%o annual distribution be made.'" Small companies have been the backbone of the industrial progress of America and, with their
opportunity to grow stifled as it is by Section 102, our economic well-being is seriously threatened. The point has been
well made that the government, by forcing corporations
under the threat of Section 102 to distribute dividends, will
in the end be a co-loser with the corporation, in that taxable
revenue resulting from capital advantageously used will not
be forthcoming. 153
An additional hazard to directors is the possibility that
because of the imposition of a 102 penalty they might be
amenable to a stockholder suit based on claimed negligence
in not declaring dividends in the taxable years. The directors involved in the Trico Products case were sued by minority stockholders on this basis and the suit was finally settled
for $2,390,000 on the understanding that dividends in excess
of 3,300,000 would forthwith be paid by the company, this
in addition to the fact that approximately $10,000,000 had
been collected in 102 penalties. 154 Logically, it might be said
that if the Tax Court has determined that the directors of a
corporation were unreasonable in accumulating earnings and
that they had as their purpose the avoidance of personal income taxes, then said findings should ipso facto insure the
success of a stockholder suit. If the Tax Court has decided
151 Cary, Accumulations Beyond the Reasonable Needs of the Business: The
Dilenina of Section 102(c), 60 HARv. L. REv. 1282, 1294-1295 (1947). See
also Goodman, Section 102-A Postwar Tax Problem, 81 J. ACCOUNTANCY

200, 201 (1946).

152 Landman, supra note 143, at 21.

153 See Holzman, What's New in 102f, 25 TAxEs 101, 110 (1947).

Note

also the statement of the plaintiff in Trico Products Corp. v. McGowan, 67

F. Supp. 311, 325 (W. D. N. Y. 1946), af'd, 169 F. 2d 343 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 335 U. S. 899 (1948) : ". . . the Revenue Department is engaged in a
short-sighted attempt to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. The Government is involved in a cause which, were it to succeed, would lose for the
Government many times over the amount of the penalties which it seeks to
enforce."
154

See Lasser & Holzman, Personal Liability of Directors for Section 102

Surtaxes, 16 CONTI.OlER 342 (1948).
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that the directors were unreasonable, what could intervene
in a stockholder litigation to change this designation of their
conduct? Fortunately, the unfairness of Section 102 would
probably not be transported to a stockholder suit. For one
thing, the Commissioner in 102 cases has the benefit not only
of presumptions not available to the plaintiff minority stockholder, but also the powerful "reasonable needs" provision
of the statute. Of course, presumptions and like mechanisms
of the law are simply supposed to supply assistance in the
quest for truth, but in tax cases they often have the reverse
effect. Recognizing that the directors have these technical
obstacles to contend with, the court in a stockholder suit
would undoubtedly seek to make a determination of its own
as to the reasonableness of the directors' conduct. 155 Of
course, the danger of a stockholder suit should not be minimized. As a matter of fact, the opinion has been expressed
that in such a suit the directors would be even more vulnerable than in an ordinary stockholder suit, inasmuch as the
element of personal gain (in the form of income tax savings)
would be present, as is not usually the case in stockholder
suits for mismanagement. 158
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Motivated mainly by the reported decisions, there have
been many articles written suggesting precautions to be
taken in order to avoid the Section 102 penalty, some of
which may be stated as follows:
(1) Record in minutes of meeting or other permanent
form any proposed plan of expenditure;
(2) If equipment is to be purchased later, place an
order for it now as evidence of the intention;
(3) Directors should keep a record of why they do not
declare dividends;
(4) A cash forecast should be prepared in advance of
the dividend meetings;
155 See Note, Derivative Actions Arising from Payment of Penalty Taxes
under Section 102, 49 CoL. L. REv. 394 (1949).
156 See Lasser & Holzman, supra note 154, at 344.
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(5) No loans should be made to stockholders or members of their families or to enterprises in which
they are interested;
(6) Do not invest in securities unrelated to the

business; 157
(7) An economist should be employed to guide
the directors in their appraisal of business
conditions; 'r6
(8) Any member of the board who would profit from
a retention of funds should resign;
(9) The dividend ratio of the taxpayer's industry
should be ascertained and considered; "ril
(10) When incorporating a business, deliberately
undercapitalize the corporation; 160 and
(11) Pay out some dividends rather than none at all.' 61
In addition, one writer has made a comprehensive compilation of the data and type of evidence that would be useful
62
in establishing the reasonableness of an accumulation.1
Suggested remedies have also been offered to those corporations which either must distribute dividends or clearly run
the risk of a 102 penalty. 163
Ever since 1938, when a vigorous assault on the statute's
constitutionality was successfully resisted in the Supreme
Court of the United States,'6 4 innumerable proposals have
been made that 102 be amended or that other steps be taken

157 Suggestions (1)
to (6) may be found in Holzman, Impact of the War's
End on Section 102, 24 TAXES 24, 32 (1946).
158 See Simons, Modern Techniques in the Practice of Tax Law, 24 TAXES

330, 337 (1946).
159 Suggestions (8) and (9) are contained in Holzman, What's New in
102?, 25 TAXES 101, 108-109 (1947).
160 See Partnershipor Corporation,86 REsAscar INsT. Am.
ANqALysIs 12
(Dec. 1951).
161 See Cary, Section 102 May Not Be the Menace Some Tax Men Consider
It To Be, 89 J. AccouNTANCY 219, 223 (1950).
162 See Lowrimore, supra note 139.
163 See Finkelstein, The Case of the Undistributed Earned Surplus, 24 ST.
JonN's L. REv. 221 (1950).
164 See Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 304 U. S. 282 (1938).
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to lessen its effect. 165 Not all sentiment, however, has been
166
running in this vein.
Among the many proposed amendments and other recommendations, some of the more noteworthy are the
following:
(1) Stockholders should report as taxable income their
pro rata share of annual taxable corporate earnings in lieu of reporting dividends received, the
corporation making advance tax payments for the
account of the stockholders; 167
(2) "At the taxpayer's option, dividends paid after the
end of the taxable year but before the due -date
(original or extended filing date) of the tax return
should be allowed as a credit in computing undistributed Section 102 net income";
(3) In the event of 102 tax, "the corporation should
be permitted to relieve itself of such tax, in whole
or in part, by a deficiency dividend... or. .. by
filing consent dividends";
(4) ". . . [C]lear statements of fact should support a
determination of a proposed assessment of the penalty surtax," and only clearly flagrant'violations
should be penalized, the taxpayer getting the benefit of any doubt; 168
(5) The burden of proof should be on the Commissioner;
(6) Instead of levying the tax on the entire amount
withheld, as is now the case, only that part which
has been unreasonably withheld should be taxable;
165 See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 149, at 658: ". . . [S]uch speculative intricacies of law and corporate management as are involved in Section 102 have
no place on principle in a fair and realistic revenue system ..
166 For a summary of the views pro and con on the merits of § 102 consult
Holzman, Impact of the War's End on Section 102, 24 TAxEs 24, 31 (1946).
See also Landman, mpra note 143, at 29 wherein it is reported that the AFL
was against any amendment of § 102 and that the CIO proposed that after
the payment of dividends a 19% tax be levied on all retained funds above
$25,000.
167 See Westfall, Integrating Federal Income Taxes on Corporations and
Their Shareholders, 27 TAxFs 236, 240 (1949).
168 For recommendations (2) to (4) see Lowrimore, supra note 139, at 219.
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(7) Double taxation of dividends should be eliminated; 169
(8) A corporation should be permitted to accumulate
a certain amount as a cushion for a bad year;
(9) When a corporation submits requested information as to its financial needs, the burden of proof
should be on the Commissioner;
(10) Publicly held corporations should be exempt from
the statute; 170
(11) Small companies should be taxed as partnerships; 171 and
(12) The first $25,000 of retained profits should be exempted from the penalty, this amount to be increased progressively according to sales, profits,
2
etc.17
More than a few authorities have been of the opinion
that mere amendment will not remedy the evils of Section
102 and that total repeal alone is the solution. 7 3 The writer
does not believe that it is wise to go this far. Undoubtedly
there are those whose purpose it is to save taxes through corporate accumulations and a sound policy of revenue collection requires some restriction on such aims. "The ideal is to
penalize the chiseler without injury to the innocent." 171 It
would seem that this ideal is impossible of attainment and
that a maximum detection of tax evasion can be achieved
only at the expense of a retarded development of business.
The question is whether first consideration should be given
to the limiting of restrictions on the growth of business or
to the apprehending of as many tax dodgers as possible.
'19See Turner, mipra note 144, wherein it is stated at 845-846 that proposals
(5) and (6) have been submitted to Congress.
170 Recommendations
(8) to (10) are set forth in Buck & Shackelford,
Retention of Earnings by Corporations Under the Income Tax Laws, 36 VA.
L. Ray. 461 (1950) (last of three published parts).
171 Randolph E. Paul, mentioned in Bock, supra note 137, at 142.
172 See Landman, supra note 143, at 28.
273 "Section 102 requires cure ...
by using the axe." Ballantine, supra note
147, at 205.
'74 Buck & Shackelford, supra note 170, at 142 (first of three published
parts).
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Section 102 gives preference to the latter alternative. It is
difficult to agree with those who maintain that the significance of Section 102 has been overemphasized and that businessmen have been needlessly conservative because of pessimistic advice given them. 17 5 Rather, the writer feels that
the section is "fraught with pitfalls" 176 and that to avoid
ruinous penalties "constant alertness" 177 is mandatory.
When it is considered that corporations are already harassed
by a burdensome excess profits tax,178 the belief becomes
strong that the section is unnecessarily detrimental to the
industrial progress of the country. 179 The amount gained in
revenue does not come close to balancing the harm done. 8 0
Our economic prosperity should not be threatened just for
the sake of ensnaring a few tax evaders. However, the situation may be righted without total annihilation of 102. It
would seem that most, if not all, of the devastating uncertainty produced by Section 102 could be eradicated by deleting from its provisions any reference to "reasonable needs"
and by placing the burden of proof squarely on the Commissioner. 181 Presumably the "reasonable needs" provision
was inserted in 102 as an aid in ascertaining whether the
prohibited purpose to avoid taxes was present. However,
in view of the manner in which the statute has been interpreted and enforced, the "aid" has now become an end in
itself and little endeavor is exerted in determining the actual
175

See Cary, Section 102 May Not Be the Menace Some Tax Men Consider

It To Be, 89 J.ACCOUNTANCY 219 (1950): "Section 102 has been so widely
feared and vilified that most businessmen probably take it too seriously." Of
a similar view is Miller, supra note 136. In Barrett, supra note 149, at 656 it
is stated that "the bark of 102 is considerably worse than its bite." However,
the reasoning of the author seems to be limited mainly to pointing out that
if the shareholder's tax bracket is high enough it is preferable, from a standpoint of immediate tax consequences, to have the corporation suffer the 102
penalty, a conclusion compelled by simple mathematics. If the stockholder's
bracket is low enough the "bite" is apt to approach rapacious proportions.
176 Goodman, supra note 151, at 200.
277 Simons, supra note 158, at 331.
178 See INT. Rav. CODE § 430 et seq.
179 See Buck & Shackelford, s'upra note 170, at 473 (last of three published

parts).

180 " . . [T]here may be abuses of the corporate option; but a statute as

unrealistic and discriminatory as Section 102 tends to cure the ailment by killing the patient." Turner, mipra note 144, at 843.
181 At present the taxpayer frequently must prove a negative, i.e., that it had
no unlawful intent, "always a difficult task." Turner, supra note 144, at 843.
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intent of the directors. Rather, the Commissioner concentrates all his effort in establishing an unreasonable accumulation and that being done, victory is almost certain to
follow.' 8 2 As one writer has indicated, what constitutes reasonable or unreasonable needs cannot be determined objectively, and there may be disagreement among the management itself, no mind between the management and the
Internal Revenue Bureau. 83 So nebulous and fleeting a concept should not be the basis of a severe penalty tax.
Concededly, the suggested statutory revision would
make the Commissioner's job not an easy one. However,
clear-cut cases of tax evasion would pose no serious problem
and cases that in the past have been decided more or less by
guesswork would be non-existent.
Section 102 as presently constituted manifestly is in
need of drastic revision and it is hoped that Congress will
not be long in coming forth with an improved version
thereof. 84

182 "In practice, application of the tax is made to depend on whether the retention of earnings or profits seems to be warranted by 'the reasonable needs
of the business.' No reliance either way seems to be placed upon establishing
the actual mental attitude of directors or stockholders. Virtually complete

reliance is placed upon the statutory presumption

note 147, at 204.
153 Ibid.

....

"

Ballantine, supra

384 Of considerable merit is the suggestion of the American Institute of

Accountants that a non-partisan tax commission be established to suggest to
Congress a complete overhauling of existing federal tax laws. See Bock,
supra note 137, at 161.

